Controlling interest
In today's world, Controlling interest has become a topic of great relevance and interest for different sectors of society. Its impact on people's daily lives has generated a series of debates and discussions around its implications. From its origins to its current state, Controlling interest has captured the attention of researchers, experts, professionals and ordinary people, who seek to understand its importance and consequences. In this article, we will explore the most relevant aspects related to Controlling interest, analyzing its influence in different areas and its future in a constantly evolving world.
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A controlling interest is an ownership interest in a corporation with enough voting stock shares to prevail in any stockholders' motion. A majority of voting shares (over 50%) is always a controlling interest. When a party holds less than the majority of the voting shares, other present circumstances can be considered to determine whether that party is still considered to hold a controlling ownership interest.
In the United States, Delaware corporations have a 2/3 vote requirement for a motion to pass.[citation needed] In theory, this could mean that a controlling interest would have to be over two-thirds of the voting shares.
A 2019 study published in the Virginia Law Review said dual-class stock structures, common to newly public technology companies, creates governance risks and costs, including the potential loss of economic value for non-voting shares held by public investors.
See also
References
- ^ Hefter, Michael; Philip, Ryan; Kolker, David. "Delaware Court Establishes "Taxonomy" For Controlling Stockholder Claims". Transaction Advisors. ISSN 2329-9134. Archived from the original on 2016-03-25. Retrieved 2015-01-16.
- ^ Governance, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate; Regulation, Financial (3 April 2019). "The Perils of Lyft's Dual-Class Structure". corpgov.law.harvard.edu.
- ^ Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kastiel, Kobi (April 18, 2017). "The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock". doi:10.2139/ssrn.2954630. S2CID 157125087. SSRN 2954630 – via papers.ssrn.com.
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