In this article we are going to address the topic of Existential generalization, which has aroused great interest in today's society. Existential generalization is an issue that has generated debates and discussions in different areas, whether in the political, social, cultural or scientific sphere. There is broad interest in learning more about Existential generalization and understanding its implications in our daily reality. For this reason, in this article we propose to analyze the different aspects and perspectives surrounding Existential generalization, with the aim of providing a comprehensive and enriching vision of this topic. Along these lines, we will explore various opinions and positions that will allow us to have a broader and enriching panorama about Existential generalization.
| Type | Rule of inference |
|---|---|
| Field | Predicate logic |
| Statement | There exists a member in a universal set with a property of |
| Symbolic statement |
In predicate logic, existential generalization[1][2] (also known as existential introduction, ∃I) is a valid rule of inference that allows one to move from a specific statement, or one instance, to a quantified generalized statement, or existential proposition. In first-order logic, it is often used as a rule for the existential quantifier () in formal proofs.
Example: "Rover loves to wag his tail. Therefore, something loves to wag its tail."
Example: "Alice made herself a cup of tea. Therefore, Alice made someone a cup of tea."
Example: "Alice made herself a cup of tea. Therefore, someone made someone a cup of tea."
In the Fitch-style calculus:
where is obtained from by replacing all its free occurrences of (or some of them) by .[3]
According to Willard Van Orman Quine, universal instantiation and existential generalization are two aspects of a single principle, for instead of saying that implies , we could as well say that the denial implies . The principle embodied in these two operations is the link between quantifications and the singular statements that are related to them as instances. Yet it is a principle only by courtesy. It holds only in the case where a term names and, furthermore, occurs referentially.[4]