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Multi-attribute auction

In this article, the topic of Multi-attribute auction will be addressed from different perspectives, with the purpose of exploring its implications, applications and relevance today. Its historical context, its possible impacts in various areas and its relevance in the current panorama will be analyzed in detail. Likewise, its possible future implications will be delved into and various points of view on Multi-attribute auction will be discussed. Through a journey through different approaches and opinions, the aim is to provide the reader with a comprehensive and detailed vision of this topic, with the aim of encouraging debate and reflection.

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A multi-attribute auction is a type of auction in which the bids have multiple parts.[1][2] Multi-attribute auctions allow agents to sell and purchase goods and services, taking into account more attributes than just price (e.g. service time, tolerances, qualities, etc.).

History

The earliest research paper about a multi-attribute auction appeared in a 1993 paper by Yeon-Koo Che.[3] In 1997, they were discussed in the context of long-term electricity contracts.[4]

Attributes

The structural elements of a bid are called designated attributes. Attributes may be verifiable, unverifiable, or auctioneer-provided.[5] If bids include a single quality, such as price, the auction is referred to as a single-attribute auction. Generally, bids are prices in English auctions, and confirmations in Dutch and Japanese auctions. In Brazilian auctions, they refer to the numbers of units being traded.

A scoring, or utility function, is essential for multi-attribute auctions, as it calculates a single number from multiple attributes, making bids that vary in multiple ways comparable.[4] This scoring function is announced by the auctioneer to the bidders before the start of the auction.[6]

See also

References

  1. ^ Pla, Albert; López, Beatriz; Murillo, Javier; Maudet, Nicolas (August 2014). "Multi-attribute auctions with different types of attributes: Enacting properties in multi-attribute auctions". Expert Systems with Applications. 41 (10): 4829–4843. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2014.02.023. hdl:10256/9601.
  2. ^ Huang, He; Liu, Liming; Parker, Geoffrey; Tan, Yinliang (Ricky); Xu, Hongyan (26 December 2018). "Multi-Attribute Procurement Auctions in the Presence of Satisfaction Risk". Production and Operations Management. 28 (5): 1206–1221. doi:10.1111/poms.12979.
  3. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo (1993). "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions". RAND Journal of Economics. 24 (4): 668–680. ISSN 0741-6261. JSTOR 2555752.
  4. ^ a b Cameron, Lisa J.; Cramton, Peter; Wilson, Robert (December 1997). "Using auctions to divest generation assets" (PDF). The Electricity Journal. 10 (10): 22–31. doi:10.1016/S1040-6190(97)80317-X. hdl:1903/7076.
  5. ^ Pla, Albert; López, Beatriz; Murillo, Javier; Maudet, Nicolas (1 August 2014). "Multi-attribute auctions with different types of attributes: Enacting properties in multi-attribute auctions". Expert Systems with Applications. 41 (10): 4829–4843. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2014.02.023. hdl:10256/9601.
  6. ^ David, Esther; Azoulay-Schwartz, Rina; Kraus, Sarit (15 July 2002). "Protocols and strategies for automated multi-attribute auctions". Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02. Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 77–85. doi:10.1145/544741.544761. ISBN 1581134800. S2CID 14576728. Retrieved 25 April 2021.