Talk:1948 Arab–Israeli War

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Inconsistencies surrounding the outbreak of violence in 1947

There are apparent inconsistencies around the outbreak of violence in the civil war, and subsequent invasion by foreign forces from Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq. In paragraph 3 of the introduction, the article presents a timeline as follows:

  1. The civil war starts in 1947
  2. Israeli forces launch an offensive in April 1948
  3. Israel declares independence in May 1948
  4. Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq invade and 10 months of conflict ensue.

In the Background section, the timeline appears inconsistent with this, as it sources information that an Egyptian force organized an embargo of supplies to 100,000 people that precipitated an offensive directly against it:

  1. The UN passes a resolution on the partition of Palestine in 1947
  2. Low level skirmishes take place in 1947
  3. The Arab Liberation Army consolidated positions, and the Holy War Army from Egypt blockaded Jewish settlements in Jerusalem in 1948.
  4. Israeli forces implemented mandatory conscription and secured arms supplies from the Soviet Union, with shipments arriving in March 1948.
  5. Israeli forces launched an offensive.

In the Initial Line-up of Forces section, under Arab forces, Lebanon is listed among the countries, however, Lebanon is omitted from the introduction. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Fileyfood500 (talk • contribs) 07:01, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

'Infobox results' recent changes

Made some recent changes to the infobox results and territorial changes.

Added 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight though not sure if it belongs there.

- IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 19:19, 28 March 2024 (UTC)

I think what's unclear currently is that it's listed under "Palestinian, Egyptian, and Syrian defeat", however this is specific to the Palestinians. You can create a separate section for Palestinian defeat and that would be more consistent. Fileyfood500 (talk) 04:38, 2 April 2024 (UTC)

Disputed passage

Is this page accurate? (Sourced only to Yoav Gelber):

The Yishuv perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs' true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly.

Ilan Pappé writes the opposite in The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine:

In public, the leaders of the Jewish community portrayed doomsday scenarios and warned their audiences of an imminent ‘second Holocaust’. In private, however, they never used this discourse. They were fully aware that the Arab war rhetoric was in no way matched by any serious preparation on the ground. As we saw, they were well informed about the poor equipment of these armies and their lack of battlefield experience and, for that matter, training, and thus knew they had only a limited capability to wage any kind of war. The Zionist leaders were confident they had the upper hand militarily and could drive through most of their ambitious plans.

When, on 18 February 1948, Sharett wrote to Ben-Gurion: ‘We will have only enough troops to defend ourselves, not to take over the country,’ Ben-Gurion replied:

"If we will receive in time the arms we have already purchased, and maybe even receive some of that promised to us by the UN, we will be able not only to defend but also to inflict death blows on the Syrians in their own country – and take over Palestine as a whole. I am in no doubt of this. We can face all the Arab forces. This is not a mystical belief but a cold and rational calculation based on practical examination."

This letter was wholly consistent with other letters the two had been exchanging ever since Sharett had been dispatched abroad. It began with a letter in December 1947 in which Ben-Gurion sought to convince his political correspondent of the Jews’ military supremacy in Palestine: ‘We can starve the Arabs of Haifa and Jaffa .’15 This confident posture regarding the Hagana’s ability to take Palestine as a whole, and even beyond, would be maintained for the duration of the fighting, inhibited only by the promises they had made to the Jordanians.

- IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 03:04, 29 April 2024 (UTC)

Here's a few quotes from Morris and one from Masalha that I happen to have in my notes:
  • Morris 1948
    • p. 97: "Through the civil war, the mufti and the AHC never issued a general call to arms or a blanket order to attack “the Yishuv.” Neither did the Arab states. British intelligence assessed that at the Arab League’s Cairo Conference in December 1947 the Arab leaders agreed that “the campaign must not start prematurely, for the Arabs are not ready, neither organized nor armed. The first real move should be made in May, by when the Mandate will have terminated.” It appears that the Arab leaders were primarily motivated by fear of antagonizing the British."
    • pp. 196-197: "If Arab war aims were disparate, the Yishuv’s initial goal was clear and simple: to survive the onslaught and establish a Jewish state. This was the chief aim both when Palestine’s Arabs attacked and when the Arab states invaded. But gradually, from December 1947 onward, one and possibly two aims were added. The first is unarguable and clear: to expand the new state so that it emerge from the war with more defensible borders and additional territory. The second was, at least among some of the leadership, to reduce the number of Arabs resident in the Jewish state ... The pan-Arab invasion of mid-May ended the hesitancy: if the Arabs were defying the United Nations and were bent on destroying the Jewish state, the Jews would take what was needed for survival, and perhaps a little more."
    • p. 397: "The Yishuv’s war aim, initially, was simpler and more modest: to survive; to weather the successive onslaughts, by the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states. The Zionist leaders deeply, genuinely, feared a Middle Eastern reenactment of the Holocaust, which had just ended; the Arabs’ public rhetoric reinforced these fears. But as the war progressed, an additional aim began to emerge: to expand the Jewish state beyond the UN-earmarked partition borders. Initially, the desire was to incorporate clusters of Jewish settlements in the state. West Jerusalem, with its hundred thousand Jews, figured most prominently in the Zionist leaders’ imagination. But as the war progressed, a more general expansionist aim took hold: to add more territory to the minuscule state and to arm it with defensible borders."
  • Masalha, Nur (2003). The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Pluto Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctt18dztmq. ISBN 978-0-7453-2120-2. JSTOR j.ctt18dztmq., p. 26: "On 30 December a British Intelligence observer reported that the Haganah was moving fast to exploit Palestinian weaknesses and disorganisation, to render them ‘completely powerless’ so as to force them into flight. "
Levivich (talk) 04:47, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
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